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ABSTRACT
Envisioning Disaster Resilient Communities
Cluster Approach: Gaps and shortcomings in UN coordination of humanitarian actors in
post-earthquake Haiti and implications for policy concerns of the New Humanitarian
school of thought

This research analyzes the role of the UN OCHA Cluster Approach in the context
of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. Gaps and shortcomings of the current humanitarian
model are identified and the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is considered as a model
to be used as an instrument to inform the New Humanitarian school of thought. A recent
history of Haiti and the political relationship to the international community will be
reviewed as context that outlines the vulnerabilities that created a risk society leading up
to the disaster. A brief history of the recent trajectory of humanitarian aid will be
reviewed and the current model critiqued with examples of partnerships between the
private business sector and the UN. Specific examples from the Agriculture and Shelter
Clusters will be provided. Finally, policy recommendations will be made to better align
the UN actions with its mission of building disaster resilient communities.
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Introduction
On January 12, 2010, a shallow, magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, the small
island nation in the Caribbean. The earthquake revealed deep vulnerabilities in the
country, tipping the already struggling nation into a state of disaster, and triggering a
humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. There was immense damage to the
capital city of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding municipalities and the loss of Haitian
life was reported at over 200,000, with over 300,000 injured and 1.5 million people
rendered homeless1. The tragedy of this catastrophe will not be forgotten and it can only
be hoped that this massive failure of the global humanitarian system can be a very urgent
reminder that as a global community, we must and can do better.
The structure of international humanitarian aid is flawed. It serves the interests of the
powerful. Instead of adequately analyzing local capacity and effectively transitioning
power to those it is mandated to serve it consolidates power and creates harmful negative
externalities. Haiti has been sidelined in an international system of capitalism that
rewards the powerful in a competition driven model. Haiti has been actively
underdeveloped to serve the international powers for more then two centuries. Greed,
power, control and good intentions by some of the world’s most privileged people and
organizations, inadvertently contributed, through action and inaction, to the resulting
death and destruction in this tiny island nation.
The loss of human life and physical capital resulting from the disaster, and the ensuing
humanitarian crisis, cannot be attributed to “natural” causes alone, as contributing factors
that lead to the disaster are entrenched in the history of the country. Haiti, commonly
referred to as, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, did not become so poor on
her own. Haiti’s history is one steeped in structural violence from colonialism to
globalization. These forces set the stage for the devastation of 2010. In the aftermath,
large companies who are contracted by the humanitarian industry, profited from the
ensuing chaos. Vulnerabilities seated deep in the economic structure of the country
existed prior to the earthquake and compounded the devastation.
There are many shortcomings in the relief efforts including; unfair prioritization in the
coordination of actors, lack of support for bolstering local capacity, and issues with
streamlining standards and training. These issues result from a concentration of funds in
the emergency phase of humanitarian aid, inadequate investment in disaster risk
reduction and prioritization of the international business sector. The UN OCHA model for
coordinating humanitarian actors is called the Cluster Approach and there is room for
improvements to more successfully meet the sustainable development objectives of the
UN agenda.
1

Oxfam International, Haiti Earthquake - Our Response, https://www.oxfam.org/en/haiti-earthquake-ourresponse, (Accessed 2017)
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The humanitarian machine descends on a country when it is in a state of emergency. The
new humanitarianism depends on the perception of catastrophe as unexpected and
unpredictable, when, in fact, if the focus is on existing vulnerability, not only is a disaster
predictable, it is avoidable. New Humanitarianism seeks to address the root causes of
vulnerability. In order to do so, it is important to take a look at the root causes of disaster
by examining the actions and inactions of the central governing body and the
international community prior to the catastrophe and determine where those who hold the
power fell short in supporting a resilient population. This paper aims to address the
shortcomings of the current humanitarian model and suggests the use of the Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach as an instrument of humanitarian relief to inform the current model
of the Cluster Approach and better align field results with the UN mandate. The ultimate
goal is to improve the UN presence and actions in order to increase the resilience of
communities to disaster.
New Humanitarianism
This discussion is situated within the current doctrine of humanitarianism concerning
disasters associated with natural hazards. Humanitarian principles are based on two main
pieces of work; the UN resolution 46/182 and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of
Conduct. The principles of classic humanitarianism are based on impartiality, neutrality,
and independence, but in the 1990’s ‘neutrality’ and respect for state sovereignty became
increasingly elusive especially in the case of complex humanitarian emergencies, an
extreme example being that of the Rwandan genocide2.
The UN describes disasters as ‘sudden onset emergencies’ and this is the point at which
the humanitarian machine is activated in response to a disaster. Appeals for funding are
activated by the emergency “shock” situation. Funding for humanitarian emergencies is
organized immediately following the shock event through Flash Appeals and CERF
(Central Emergency Revolving Fund) requests. If the disaster persists more then six
months then the CAP (Consolidated Appeals Process) is considered.3 The CAP is
informed by the collaboration of host governments, NGOs, the UN agencies, IOM, The
Red Cross Movement, donors, and aid agencies. These stakeholders produce a Common
Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) that informs the development of the CAP4. Basically,
2

Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and
Humanitrain Interventions (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 48.
3

United Nations, Central Emergency Response Fund CERF Rapid Response Window and Flash Appeals,
https://www.unocha.org/cerf/sites/default/files/CERF/CERF_and_FA_20.11.08.pdf, (accessed 2017)
4Inter-Agency

Standing Committee, Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), https://
interagencystandingcommittee.org/consolidated-appeals-process-cap, (accessed 2017)
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the global supply chain for humanitarian relief starts with a disaster and a “needs
assessment”, then the donors and suppliers (government, companies, foundations) pledge
money that goes into the recipient agencies (government, NGOs, Red Cross, WFP etc.)
then it is passed to the implementing agency (government agencies, global and local
NGOs, local organizations, military) and finally delivered to serve the people in need.
New humanitarianism is politically involved in that it has an influence on the political
economy of the recipient country and is dependent on the decisions of member states of
the UN and the “permanent observers” involved in the UN system including
intergovernmental organizations like The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) a grouping
of twenty countries, fifteen Member States and five Associate Members; The
Organization of American States (OAS); The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
and specialized agencies such as The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) The
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) including the International Montetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank (WB).
In situations where the state has become weak, new humanitarianism perceives state
sovereignty as secondary to the responsibility of the international community to
intervene. “The ‘new humanitarian’ paradigm authorizes intervention, recognizing the
limits of sovereignty, especially in the case of weak and failing states and promoting the
international norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). The R2P framework is based
on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but an international responsibility.
Accordingly, if a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities to protect its people from harm,
the international community has the responsibility to intervene”5.
With the perception of disaster focused on the shock event as the main cause, the
humanitarian machine is activated once the conditions are already extreme. In line with
the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Sendai Framework, natural hazards are separate
from the effect the event has on the population and the use of the expression “disasters
associated with natural hazards” will take the place of “natural disasters”. By associating
the disaster with the natural hazard, such as an earthquake, hurricane, tornado etc., the
cause of the damages is dismissed as natural and uncontrollable, and the responsibility is
deflected away from the authorities meant to protect the population. Natural disaster is
therefore a politically desirable term for the media to use as the blame is focused on
natural causes. The preventable root causes of the disaster, many times political and
economic, are dismissed and the focus is on saving the ‘helpless victims’. Therefore,
disaster associated with natural hazards correlates to the level of human action or inaction
taken to address vulnerability and strengthen the coping capacities of a population. In
other words, the actions and funding dedicated to Disaster Risk Reduction and building
resilient communities determines the level of the disaster, not the natural hazard itself.
5

Madalina Elena Nan, “New Humanitarianism with Old Problems: The Forgotten Lesson of Rwanda”, The
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, (2010), https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/780
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Two definitions of vulnerability apply to the situation in Haiti. The Hyogo Framework for
Action defines vulnerability as “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic,
and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community
to the impact of hazards”6. Similarly, vulnerability is discussed as “the characteristics of
a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover
from the impact of a natural hazard”7.
Haiti: History of vulnerability that lead to disaster
Haiti was in a state of disaster before the earthquake. The risk society that had been the
norm for so long in Haiti prior to the earthquake, is the undeniable result of imperialism,
neoliberal economic structural adjustment, and globalization. The majority of the country
was hanging by a thread long before the earthquake. The health and education levels of
the country were extremely low as there was widespread poverty and it is estimated that
one half of the population was undernourished before the earthquake.8
The reason that there is a focus on relief is because the structure of humanitarian
assistance is such that the relief phase is activated by a shock event and any issues prior
to emergency have been regarded as the responsibility of the state. The capacity of the
state to invest in the reduction of vulnerability to disaster is weakened by increasing debt
peonage to the international lending institutions inextricably linked to the international
private business sector. The US has more voting power at the IMF because it has a higher
quota and is therefore able to influence how the IMF money is spent.9 When the very
services that would create a healthy, resilient population are cut to pay debts, it is near to
impossible for poor nations like Haiti to get a foothold in the global economy and to
adequately protect their citizens from harm and fund disaster risk reduction.
The earthquake, as are many ‘natural disasters’, was broadcast to the global community
as a natural, unexpected, shock event that created all the suffering and death that ensued.
The reasons for the damage are not just because of the earthquake. The damage is
because of inadequate funding and planning for disaster risk reduction and resilience
6

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to
Disaster, UNISDR. 2004. https://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogoframework-for-action-english.pdf
7

Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability,
and Disasters. (Routledge, 1994), 9.
8

Mary Mederios Kent, Earthquake Magnifies Haiti’s Economic and Health Challenges http://www.prb.org/
Publications/Articles/2010/haiti.aspx (accessed 2017)
9

International Monetary Fund, IMF Quotas, http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/
2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas (accessed 2017)
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building prior to the earthquake. This means actions taken to ensure buildings are up to
code, that there are emergency plans in place, that there are early warning systems in
place etc. A shift towards analyzing the risk factors present in a society will activate the
UN system before a shock event unleashes the built up tension. This idea was discussed
in the Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005-2015, as well as in the Sendai Framework,
2015-2030. The main priority of the Sendai Framework is “Understanding Disaster Risk”
so that humanitarian assistance can play a role in creating cultures of prevention.
Haiti, a small island nation occupying the margin of our global community, faces unique
threats to natural hazards because of its geographic location. The location of Haiti in the
Caribbean makes it susceptible to hurricanes, tropical storms, and earthquakes. This
compounded by existing vulnerabilities, sets the stage for immense and devastating
effects from geological and hydrometeorological events.
In 1994, the idea of measuring environmental vulnerability entered the development
dialogue at the Global Summit on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) held in
Barbados. Specifically focused on the heightened vulnerability of SIDS, this conference
proposed the creation of a vulnerability index to determine which countries were at
higher risk of disaster. This model was globalized by 2003.10 The EVI vulnerability
report is organized into a scoring classification for each nation analyzed from less than
215 points representing a Resilient nation to more than 365 points representing an
Extremely Vulnerable nation. Haiti ranked 343 in 2004 on the EVI as Highly
Vulnerable.11 SIDS, in regards to natural hazards, are considered among the most
vulnerable in the world. The economic, social and environmental impacts are
disproportionate among these small nations.12
In Haiti, deforestation and soil erosion increase the risk of landslides during a hazard
event13. This issue of environmental vulnerability is explicitly seen in Haiti where
exploitation of natural resources has resulted in environmental and socio-economic
concerns such as deforestation largely due to agricultural exploitation over the past few
centuries. The plantation system of intensive monocropping of crops such as cotton,

10

SOPAC, The Environmental Vulnerability Index, 2004. http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/EVI%202004%20Technical%20Report.pdf (accessed 2017)
11

SOPAC, The Environmental Vulnerability Index, 2004. http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/EVI%202004%20Technical%20Report.pdf (accessed 2017)
12

United Nations, International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, January 10-14, 2005, http://www.un.org/
smallislands2005/A-CONF207-L_1.pdf (accessed 2017)
13

United Nations, International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, January 10-14, 2005, http://www.un.org/
smallislands2005/A-CONF207-L_1.pdf (accessed 2017)
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indigo, tobacco, sugarcane, and coffee stripped the land of its fertility.14 The
environmental vulnerability of the country is of serious concern but it is not the only
factor contributing to the risk society.
Haiti: History of structural violence and oppression
Structural violence is the harm caused to people from the social and economic structural
arrangements of our world. Those who are denied access to the basics of survival and
who are unable to take advantage of scientific progress are the victims of structural
violence. It is not the fault of culture or individual will but rather it is the result of
historical structures that allow for inequity to persist.15
Haiti, previously called the “pearl of the Antilles”, was the most profitable of the French
colonies. The small nation has been economically squeezed since its beginning with the
successful slave revolt against France in 1804. France did not recognize Haiti as a free
state until two decades after its founding and the US and England followed France’s lead.
When France did finally recognize Haiti’s hard fought independence the recognition
came with a caveat. France insisted that Haiti pay 150 million francs for the losses that
Haiti’s independence cost France. This is the equivalent of 3 billion dollars in todays
currency.16 Haiti took loans from French banks to pay this debt. By 1898, 50% of Haiti’s
budget went to France. In 1914, 80% of Haiti’s budget went to France. To pay the first
installment of 30 million francs, Haitian president Boyer, closed all the schools.17
The people of Haiti have long endured foreign occupations and structural violence that
continually set the country back developmentally. Vulnerabilities created by political
maneuvering and structural violence are what lead to the devastation of the earthquake in
2010. Fanmi Lavalas, created in 1996, is the leftist, pro-democracy political party started
by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a liberation theologian, grass-roots activist, and leader of the
people’s movement who became the first democratically elected president. Aristide won
the first democratic election held after Jean-Claude Duvalier was overthrown and
promised sweeping changes to shift the government from an oppressive, violent state, to
a state that would support the people.18 Since the early 1980s, Aristide spoke out against

14

Nathan C McClintock, Agroforestry and Sustainable Resource Conservation in Haiti: A Case Study,
https://projects.ncsu.edu/project/cnrint/Agro/PDFfiles/HaitiCaseStudy041903.pdf (accessed 2017)
15

Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)

16

Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, (Picador, January 2013)

17

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Eyes of the Heart, (Common Courage Press, 2000)

18

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012)
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US policy and was one of the most prominent voices of protest.19 Aristide was a leader
of the people which positioned him against the interests of the elite and the foreign
powers. On September 30, 1991, he was overthrown less than eight months after his
inauguration by a coup organized by the Haitian army supported by the countries elite. In
the aftermath of the coup thousands of Lavalas supporters were killed.20
1994, Aristide was returned to the presidency, escorted by the US. The US and the UN
took over the duties of the Haitian army and the “international financial institutions
insisted that Aristide follow the neoliberal economic doctrine and remove all protectionist
tariffs.”21 This pressure to liberalize the markets ultimately served the interests of foreign
business and devastated Haitian rice growers and created a dependency on imported
foods. When Aristide tried to resist the neoliberal doctrine he was threatened with
withheld loans and aid. It was difficult for Aristide to implement state projects to improve
the livelihoods of the people because of the crippling debt to foreign lenders.22
In 2000, Aristide is reelected for another term and Fanmi Lavalas wins the legislative and
local elections. Aristide refused to implement neoliberal policies. “The government was
weakened by trying to hold the empty middle ground between its popular base and the
depraved demands of the ‘international community’.23 A massive disinformation
campaign in the media to discredit Aristide was formulated to prepare for a coup. The
paramilitary death squad, FRAPH, had ties to the CIA and instigates terror and violence
that creates the necessary chaos to transition power. The Convergence Democratique, an
anti-Lavalas coalition, is formed with the assistance of the Organization of American
States (OAS) and the intention of discrediting Aristide and the Lavalas electoral success.
Under the pretense that Aristide is corrupt, Canada, US, and France meet in Ottowa to
plan regime change in Haiti through the Canadian doctrine of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) “which gives strong countries license to intervene in weak countries.”24
The R2P report was established in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which was set up by the Canadian Government. It was

19

Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, (Picador, January 2013)

20

Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, (Picador, January 2013), 363.

21

Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, (Picador, January 2013), 363.

22

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012)
23

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 41.
24

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 42.
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created as a response to criticism of the failure of the international community to
affectively respond to the atrocities committed in the 1990’s, namely that of the Rwandan
genocide. Kofi Annan challenged the Member States to come up with a solution to the
issue of state sovereignty preventing intervention when there are systematic violations of
human rights that the state is either not willing or able to prevent or is in fact the
perpetrator of such crimes. The R2P reframed sovereignty as state responsibility as
opposed to a protection against intervention. Of course, like any doctrine, this reversal of
what was previously a protection for weak states against strong states can be used as it
was intended or can be manipulated as a way to intervene and take advantage. 25
The European community and the US respond to the weakened Haitian government by
cutting aid to Haiti. The Bush administration urges the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) to cancel $650 million dollars in development assistance to Haiti and the
IDB demands that Haiti pay debts of $1.134 billion dollars (40% which was money lent
during the corrupt Duvalier dictatorship). In 2003, Haiti sends 90% of their foreign
reserves to Washington to pay interest on this debt. In 2004, a coup overthrows Aristide
through a combination of economic pressure, paramilitary violence, co-optation of civil
society organizations, and media disinformation campaigns.26 The strategic weakening
of the government gave way to the transfer of power.
Aristide was kidnapped by the American military in the coup d’etat on February 28th,
2004. Aristide said, “One could say that it was a geo-political kidnapping. I can clearly
say that it was a terrorism disguised as diplomacy.”27 The American military personnel
told Aristide that the paramilitary army (funded by the CIA) was stationed in Port-auPrince and preparing for a massacre of thousands of Haitians if Aristide did not go with
the military personnel. Aristide was then removed from Haiti and brought against his will
to the Central African Republic. Podur reports that, “The kidnapping and the invasion by
the US, Canadian and French troops was the key to the entire coup.”28 Venezuela, South
Africa, and the Caribbean Community of nations CARICOM, condemned the coup.29

25

United Nations, Responsibility to Protect, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibilityto-protect.html (accessed 2017)
26

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012)
27

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 55.
28

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 56.
29

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 57.
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Once Aristide was removed, actions were immediately taken that threatened labor rights,
such is the case of Grupo M. The production facility operating in the Dominican
Republic and Haiti free trade zones refused to negotiate with labor union, SOKOWA, and
254 workers were fired. SOKOWA had to fight to get Grupo M to come to the
negotiation table to reinstate the workers.30 The workforce went on strike and
paramilitary forces disbanded the workers with force and destroyed one hundred buses
used for a transportation co-operative created under Aristide’s government.31 This
violence is structural in that Grupo M, an example of a much wider trend, was under
contract funded by a $20 million dollar loan on January 15, 2004, from the World Bank’s
private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) under the guise of helping
improve Haiti’s economy. This loan was approved after the company came under
investigation in 2003 in the Dominican Republic for abuse of workers‘ rights. The IFC
reported that the “project deserves continued strong support given its development
impact, even if some wrongdoing was demonstrated.”32 This “Development impact” was
not people-centered development to improve the resilience of the communities in Haiti, it
was Development for the financial benefits of the already powerful. The ideology that a
capitalist free market model will lift all boats is the definition of neoliberalism and this
example shows how it is violating instead of upholding the rights of those it proposes to
support.33
Making connections: The US, UN, and Haiti
When an economy is squeezed tightly by structural adjustment and international debt
peonage designed by the IMF and the WB, a nation-state is kept powerless and more
easily utilized as a passive labor force (such as in garment factories in free trade zones
like Grupo M in Haiti). The weak local economy creates dependence on international
stakeholders and when a hazard strikes, the humanitarian machine is activated to bring
the country back to the status quo of a weak state serving the interests of the private and
state international powers. The increasingly securitized humanitarian regime is intimately
connected to the perpetrators of this narrative.
The complexity of the UN’s involvement in Haiti is undeniable. The evidence begs to
argue that the ousting of Aristide was a CIA backed US led coup that the UN supported
through a securitization mission. The US pays approximately 22% of the UN budget
30

Haiti Support Group, Haiti:Update on Grupo M, September 27, 2004. http://www.labournet.net/world/
0409/haiti1.html (accessed 2017)
31

Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, The Earthquake and the UN Occupation, (London,
Pluto Press, 2012), 58.
32

Bretton Woods Project, IFC Haiti Project Funding goes ahead dispite investigation’s “mixed results”,
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2004/02/art-35235/ (accessed 2017)
33

Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
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annually. In 2010, the US paid $517,133,507 into the UN budget.34 A report from the UN
Foundation shows that the UN Secretariat procured more than $832 million from US
companies in the same year.35 This means that for fiscal year 2010, the US economy
benefited from the relationship with the UN by approximately $314,866,493 in private
profits. The United States relationship with the United Nations has clear financial benefits
for the US economy. How much money did US companies make from UN contracts in
the reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake? If US companies did not get the
contracts, how many Haitian companies could have? How many more Haitian run
companies could be competitive if there had been adequate funding for schools and
public services?
In 2015, NPR reports, "USAID has spent about $1.5 billion since the earthquake. . . Less
than a penny of every dollar goes directly to a Haitian organization."36 A growing
reliance on U.S. and other international contractors helps explain why the payoff of
foreign aid in Haiti often seems so low. For instance, it cost more than $33,000 to build a
new housing unit in one post-earthquake program, a report from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office said last year. That's five times more than one nonprofit, called
Mission of Hope, spends per house, using local contractors. "International companies had
to fly in, rent hotels and cars, and spend USAID allowances for food and cost-of-living
expenses," Johnston wrote in the Boston Review last year. So-called danger pay and
hardship pay inflated salaries by more than 50 percent.37
The weakening of the national government, the influx of international support, the
coordination of the UN, and the profits gained by US companies... this trajectory, whether
by predatory design or not, is not meeting the UN agenda of eliminating poverty. In fact,
the current model depends on poverty and “helpless victims” to continue functioning.
There is a shift happening that recognizes the importance of bolstering local capacity and
pushes back against the paradigm of saving the helpless victims and shifting towards
treating people as dignified human beings within a global community. First though, let us
look at the reason why companies are able to operate unregulated in poor nations.
34

United Nations Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’ advances to the Working Capital Fund for the
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Histories of corruption that have created mistrust of national government serve to justify
the involvement of international companies. The history of corruption within the
government of Haiti still lingers in the global consciousness and creates an avenue for
unregulated involvement in the development of the nation.
The perception of corruption in Haiti is not unfounded and arises from the 29 year French
dictatorship of the Duvaliers, the father-son rule that stole an estimated $900 million from
the Haitian people, the rightful benefactors, and funneled the money into their own
private accounts. After the end of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship, Jean Betrand Aristide,
and his political party, Fanmi Lavalas, began to dismantle the structures of military
oppression. Aristide met severe opposition from the countries elite who desperately
supported the military presence. In 1991 the army overthrew Aristide and hundreds of his
supporters were killed. “The Convergence Democratique, the US-funded pro-army
opposition group, demonized the Haitian government of Fanmi Lavalas as corrupt and
provided the funds to create an impressive propaganda exercise to compare Aristide with
his tyrannical and violent predecessor Francois Duvalier and his paramilitary squad the
Tontons Macoutes”38. Leading up to his abduction in 2004, widespread media coverage
portrayed Aristide as a failure in establishing democracy, and accused him of falling into
the same authoritarian style as the Duvalier dictator he fought against39. The history of
corruption, both real and contrived, has been instilled in the collective memory of the
people living in Haiti as well as abroad. The legitimacy of the Haitian national authorities
has been damaged by this perception of corruption, spreading an impression of
inadequacy to the international community and instilling a perception of mistrust.
This mistrust of national authorities in Haiti, some would say, was by design40 and others
simply recognize it as an impediment to development. Institutional responsibility taken
over by the international community, NGOs working in the specific sectors instead of
government run and regulated sector coordination, poses a concern of accountability to
the Haitian people, especially when the international community is so closely linked with
foreign business interests. In the humanitarian aid framework, the system first and
foremost is a post-disaster subsidiary support for the national government to help
coordinate humanitarian actors and mitigate disaster. In the case of Haiti, this
responsibility, almost entirely lies in the hands of the UN because of weak national
capacity. There are mechanisms set up in the Cluster System to interface with the national
authorities and assist the government in the arduous task of coordinating hundreds of
organizations and humanitarian workers and the humanitarian branch of the UN works
with national governments to strengthen preparedness and prevention measures.
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The national capacities are often side-stepped even when they do exist because of the
history of corruption. Decision making power is cornered by the international actors, and
legitimacy circumvents the government along with the money 41. This is the challenge in
Haiti, where the bulk of aid money has been funneled through international NGOs and
agencies. Less than 1% of proposed funds flowed through the hands of the GoH.
Considering the damaged government capacities, it is not surprising that funds have
skirted the GoH, yet without the oversight of national authorities there is the concern of
accountability to the Haitian people. Podur argues that this perception of mistrust is by
design to justify the money circumventing national authorities.
Dr. Maryse Narcisse, the Haiti presidential candidate from the Lavalas party, spoke in
Oakland, California in the Spring of 2017 about the international involvement in the
country stating, “There is a lot of interference in the internal affairs of Haiti a lot of
meddling by the countries like the US by the UN the OAS. These are countries that call
themselves ‘friends of Haiti’ those countries, their meddling, is creating instability in the
country and they create a weakness in the institutions of the country.”
The perception of corruption and the ‘meddling’ the Narcisse speaks of have contributed
to, and justified, circumventing the government and stripping it of responsibility and
decision-making power. The perception of government corruption suggests that the
international actors such as the UN IASC (United Nation Inter-Agency Standing
Committee) are better equipped to manage the relief than the Haitian authorities. The aid
money circumventing the government is detrimental to relief being carried out because
NGOs and international corporations are not necessarily accountable to the Haitian
people and by not supporting the capacity of the national authorities creates an
unregulated market that makes it easier for corporations to implement projects without
being held by regulation. The cluster system attempts to remedy this problem by
clustering these organizations and creating a cohesion of objectives but there are
powerful stakeholders connected to the Cluster Approach that raise questions of
impartiality.
UN OCHA Cluster Approach Framework
The Cluster Approach is a sector and needs-based system used to multilaterally
coordinate the UN and non UN humanitarian organizations working in a disaster setting.
This system is a humanitarian mechanism that aims to strengthen global and field level
capacity to respond efficiently to disasters caused by natural hazards and conflict
situations. Its first implementation was in 2005 and it has since been activated globally in
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30 countries.42 The Cluster Approach is activated to respond to complex humanitarian
emergencies in order to facilitate sector-based coordination with national and
international humanitarian actors including intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and private sector organizations as well as national partners. These entities
are grouped according to sector, such as health, agriculture, shelter, etc. in order to
streamline relief, fill gaps, share resources, and reduce duplication of projects. In theory,
this approach functions as a supporting structure to the national government and aligns
the clusters of humanitarian actors with the national authorities. The key objectives are to
ensure adequate global capacity to respond to the emergency, “alleviate human suffering
in disasters and emergencies, advocate the rights of people in need, promote preparedness
and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.”43 The Cluster System creates a
space for humanitarian organizations to cooperate in information sharing in order to
identify and act upon the strategic priorities of the cluster. The members work to mitigate
the impact of a hazard and respond to the needs of the vulnerable population. The UN
cluster approach is like the scaffolding built to repair a damaged or deteriorating structure
of Haiti, yet there was little national structure to build on and inequitable power dynamics
inherent in the international approach have inadvertently created barriers to the
participation of important local stakeholders whose capacity the UN is mandated to
support.
OCHA operates out of two headquarters located in Geneva and New York. The top-down
structure of OCHA originates with the Secretary General at the top and then directly
beneath, the Under Secretary General (USG) who is also the Emergency Relief
Coordinator (ERC). The USG/ERC is responsible for humanitarian policy development
and the coordination of the international humanitarian response as well as being the focal
point for governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental relief activities. The
ERC chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which is the primary
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance involving the major
international humanitarian actors. This committee leads the inter-agency forum where
humanitarian dialogue, decision making and policy development takes place among the
major humanitarian actors including UN, governmental, and non-governmental
organizations. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) is guided
by the USG/ERC to ensure that the response is organized and the HC works with
government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and affected
communities. An OCHA office is created in support of the DSRSG/RC/HC and the
cluster system is under the direction of the DSRSG/RC/HC.
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Within the context of post-disaster Haiti, there were numerous uncoordinated actors
occupying the humanitarian space with various ideologies, promoting a variety of best
practices for assistance. OCHA has the responsibility of coordinating national and
international actors and utilizes the cluster approach to manage the relief efforts. The
limitations of this approach will be measured through an analysis of participatory
components including the support for local capacity building as well as mechanisms that
focus on strengthening national authorities.
The Cluster System in Haiti is made up of 11 clusters and 2 sub-clusters. The clusters
activated after the earthquake were Agriculture, Education, Food, Health, Nutrition,
Protection, Child Protection, Gender-Based Violence, Shelter, Water and Sanitation, Early
Recovery, and Camp Coordination Camp Management (CCCM).
Each Cluster is lead by a Cluster Lead Agency (CLA). The lead agency has the
responsibility of coordinating the humanitarian organizations working within a specific
sector. The CLAs activated in Haiti after the earthquake are:
Global Cluster Leads

CLA in Haiti

CCCM IOM

CCCM/Shelter – NFI IOM

Early Recovery UNDP

Early Recovery UNDP

Education UNICEF

Education UNICEF

Emergency Shelter UNHCR
Emergency
Telecommunications WFP

Emergency
Telecommunications WFP

Food Security FAO

Agriculture FAO

Health WHO

Health WHO/PAHO

Logistics WFP

Logistics WFP
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Global Cluster Leads

CLA in Haiti

Nutrition UNICEF

Nutrition UNICEF

Water Sanitation and
Hygiene UNICEF

WASH UNICEF

Protection UNHCR The line Protection OHCHR
ministries
- Protection sub cluster:
Child Protection UNICEF
- GBV UNFPA

The majority of the CLA’s are UN agencies. Sometimes at the country level there are
other organizations or private entities that work in conjunction with the CLA. In Haiti,
the cluster coordinator is a member of the lead agency and has the responsibility of
organizing the cluster meetings. Cluster meetings are periodic, weekly or bi-weekly
meetings that are set up by the cluster coordinator to collaborate with the humanitarian
organizations working in the specific sector to construct strategic plans for humanitarian
relief. The purpose of cluster coordination is to bring all of the actors to the table to
decide on consistent objectives in order to mitigate the possibility of duplicated projects
and fragmentation of resources. In order for the organizations to arrive at a consensus, the
Cluster System requires that individual agencies cooperate in aligning programmes with
strategic objectives agreed on by the Cluster”44.
Coordination is an essential component to humanitarian assistance but it is not without
challenges. In addition to providing basic needs resources to the people, one of the main
challenges facing the humanitarian efforts in post-disaster Haiti is the hindered capability
of the national authorities. In December of 1991, UN General Assembly Resolution
46/182 designated government and national actors of the affected state as having the
primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of
humanitarian assistance within the state.45 For varying reasons, such as lack of capacity,
damaged ministries, language barriers, inconsistent recovery plans, corruption, and
deeply embedded mistrust, the coordination between national authorities and
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international humanitarian actors in post-disaster Haiti has been a critical barrier to
recovery.
Components of the Cluster Approach itself, such as the powerful role of the CLA, have
undermined the ability of the system to fully support local resiliency. Examples from the
Agriculture Cluster as well as the Shelter Cluster will be discussed. The aim here is to
identify the gaps in the cluster system and provide recommendations to improve the
participatory elements of the system to utilize and rebuild local capacity and establish
resiliency.
Partnerships with the government and local stakeholders are necessary for bolstering
national capacity. By ensuring a strong local system, dependency on foreign capacity can
be minimized. Sustainable development objectives can be compromised when the
international humanitarian stakeholders work independently of the national government.
Without the involvement of local entities true accountability to the people comes into
question. Additionally, international actions are often donor driven and not adequately
informed by the local realities. This trajectory of aid circumventing the national
authorities and local stakeholders is predicated on a false narrative that the local
stakeholders are unable to carry out the development objectives. The question is raised: Is
the international community unwilling to relinquish is profitable position of power over
the Haitian people in order to prioritize the true mission of resilience? Haitians have
called for the opportunities for self-determination in their own country. The people are
tired of being perceived as helpless victims and the passive recipients of assistance. The
Haitian people want to have a say in how the country recovers and develops.
The Haitian people and other ‘beneficiaries’ of aid will not have their voices heard in the
aid process as long as access to the humanitarian industry continues to be a challenge for
local participants. There were gaps in the national government oversight of the
international aid operations. For example, the shelter cluster was run by the IFRC out of
an office established at the MINUSTAH Base in Port-au-Prince. Engagement by the
central government was low and the Shelter Cluster had no government counterpart.46
There was limited participation of Haitian organizations in the humanitarian decision
making process and project funding cycle. OCHA reported that the clusters operated in
deliberations and planning almost completely excluding the national government. For
many Haitian organizations access to the MINUSTAH Logbase was limited because it
was challenging to get to and put an extra strain on their time and budgets. OCHA
reported that only organizations with surplus staff could send people to Logbase for
meetings. Representatives from organizations were finding it difficult to access the area
and it would sometimes take members of NGOs 3-4 hours to navigate the streets of PAP
and reach the cluster meetings many of which were being held bi-weekly. Additionally,
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many meetings (such as in the Shelter Cluster and initially the GBV Cluster) were held in
English, limiting the participation of national organizations who operate in French and
Haitian creole. GBV meetings under the Protection cluster switched to French and saw an
increase in local NGO participation.
The circumventing of the national government on the premise of mistrust and corruption
has been a common avenue for aid programs that seek to take advantage of the Haitian
environment and labor force. By delegitimizing the capacity of the Haitian government,
aid organizations can justify implementing projects independent of government. For
example, USAID in Haiti spent $270 million of aid money in 2013. 40% went to
American NGOs and 50% went to US based corporations. Chemonics International
received $58 million claiming that they would promote the recovery of Haiti and invest in
“laying the foundation for long term development”.47 The presence of corporate interests
that were well intentioned, but not truly people-centered, and were largely focused on
profit, emerged as USAID and Chemonics attempted to establish a biofuel agro-industry
in Haiti by planting Jatropha curcas under the humanitarian auspice of USAID’s
WINNER project. The main objective which was to secure eroded hillsides in order to
improve irrigation and crop success. Mint Press News reported on this as the “only long
term foundations that are being laid are for the total corporate annexation of Haiti’s
economy”. 48 On USAID’s website there is no mention of the WINNER project
objective to grow a biofuel agro-industry in Haiti. There are successes in improving
yields of edible crops and improving the watershed use on the hillsides of the Cul-deSac,
Cabaret, Mirebalais, and Arcahaie regions, but information regarding these regions as
biofuel plant test sites was not mentioned. What else was not explicitly mentioned is
Chemonics‘ partnership with Monsanto to bring in GMO corn to one location.
Haiti: Agriculture Cluster
The annexation of Haiti’s agricultural sector by a foreign power is not new. In 1915, US
marines landed in Haiti to ‘reestablish political order’ after a bloody coup. The US stayed
for twenty years. Structural violence and abusive political paternalism hide behind the
promise of improving infrastructure, roads and schools. The dark side of US occupation
was the takeover of the agricultural sector.49 There was rural to urban migration in Haiti
when the US agricultural companies entered and deprived the peasants of their land. This
occupation displaced local small scale farmers, deepened Haiti’s dependence on outside
powers, and depleted the soil over generations of intensive agriculture.
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UN OCHA Cluster Approach and disaster capitalism: Chemonics
The narrative of Chemonics was to assist USAID in improving crop yields for small scale
Haitian farmers and assisting in securing eroded hillsides with the Jatropha plant. On this
premise, Chemonics was justified in working on the assistance program. Once they
secured aid money from the agency they implemented the objectives with a few
additional unapproved actions such as starting to incorporate international seeds supplied
by Monsanto as well as planting out massive amounts of the Jatropha plants to be test
sites for growing them as biofuels. An initial evaluation was done that proved that using
the plants for biofuels would not enhance the long term security of the farmers. The
economic incentive for Chemonics in partnering with Monsanto and testing the
implementation of biofuel crops diminished their ability to fully realize food security
goals. The for-profit model of this company incentivizes profit driven actions. In the
process, Chemonics violated the UN Global Compact anti-corruption principle.
Socially responsible business practices in sustainable development is meaningless if the
company is not transparent with all of their objectives. With the poor track records of
companies like Chemonics, it is a challenge to regulate and ensure that they are operating
according to their mandates and not prioritizing free-market solutions that go against their
proposed sustainable development mission. To meet humanitarian and development
objectives, it is crucial that businesses adhere to the UN Global Compact and are able to
operationalize on objectives to improve livelihoods in recovery settings.
There were protests of approximately 10,000 Haitians against the introduction of patented
corn seeds donated to the WINNER program by Monsanto. Importing seeds can lead to
dependency and because the seeds are not acclimated to the local environment, they can
require higher priced inputs. Not only were the seeds treated with chemicals, but they do
not reproduce for the security of the next season’s crop. This can create a cycle of
dependency, indebtedness and poverty for already poor farmers. 50 The objectives of
planting crops for biofuels and allowing the integration of highly contentious genetically
modified organisms to enter through this project were not clearly highlighted in the
project goals, and the beneficiaries of this project were not involved or informed of the
full scope of the project. The inability of USAID and Chemonics to be transparent and
accountable, created a failed humanitarian/corporate partnership that is inadequate to
meet the needs of the most important stakeholders, the Haitian people.
This example of USAIDs contract with a private company shows how the actions of
humanitarian agencies can be contradictory to the mission of the UN sustainable
development goals. The structure of the UN OCHA cluster approach has gaps that allow
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for these concerning contracts to be made. Issues of unequal power and impartiality arise
with the CLA and are a serious concern for the objectives created for the cluster. The
CLAs are partnered with the private sector from small organizations and cooperatives to
the largest international corporations. The private partnerships are not inherently
problematic they only become so when the UN and government counterparts are unable
to hold the companies accountable to the local population and aid money is squandered in
the process. In the UN literature, the local organizations are often referred to as the
‘implementing organizations’ but are often excluded from the decision making process.
The unequal power dynamic and issue with impartiality of the CLAs has prevented the
UN from fully realizing its humanitarian objectives.
With the USAID example in mind, let us look at the Cluster Lead Agency for the
Agriculture Sector, the FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN. The actions of
the humanitarian model and what is proposed is also important to consider. Here is an
excerpt from the literature of the UN sustainable development agenda:
•Agriculture is the single largest employer in the world, providing livelihoods for 40
per cent of today’s global population. It is the largest source of income and jobs
for poor rural households.
•500 million small farms worldwide, most still rainfed, provide up to 80 per cent of
food consumed in a large part of the developing world. Investing in smallholder
women and men is an important way to increase food security and nutrition for
the poorest, as well as food production for local and global markets.
•Since the 1900s, some 75 per cent of crop diversity has been lost from farmers’ fields.
Better use of agricultural biodiversity can contribute to more nutritious diets,
enhanced livelihoods for farming communities and more resilient and sustainable
farming systems.51

With these statistics in mind and the UN literature promoting the support of small scale
agriculture, let us look at the current relationship between the FAO, the UN and the
‘beneficiaries’ of aid. In 2013, the FAO put forth a Strategy for Partnership with the
Private Sector. Can the FAO be a neutral stakeholder in the humanitarian arena when it is
partnered with the private sector? One of the largest contributors to the FAO budget and
also a major resource partner is the United States. The US supports the FAO through
cooperation in emergency assistance, building resilience, food security, sustainable
agriculture and the management of natural resources. 52 The US agency that oversees
foreign assistance is USAID. The relationship of USAID and Haiti, as previously shown,
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is heavily influenced by corporate interests. The program through which USAID supports
Haiti in a disaster setting is the United States Department of Agriculture Food For Peace
program (FFP). Through this program, the US sends American crops abroad on American
owned ships, to be sold as a source of revenue for aid operations. The U.S. Congress
mandates that fifteen percent of food aid be monetized through this model.53 The
Maritime Administration (MARAD) is the entity which controls US flag ships that carry
food aid abroad. These vessels are also equipped with military capabilities in times of
war. 54 One sentiment from the small scale local agricultural sector of Haiti is “why can’t
the donors buy food from us and distribute that food to the affected regions?” 55
Through the partnership of USAID and the FAO, 90,000 metric tons of American crops
were sent to Haiti as part of the Food for Progress program and Food for Peace. 56
USAID reports that nearly four million people in the first three months post-earthquake
were provided with emergency food relief, the largest distribution ever. 57 The food
needs of many people in Haiti were met by the distribution but as Jean-Baptiste, Director
of the Haitian farmers collective Peasant Movement of Papay, states “After the
earthquake, the country needed food to help the victims in some places. But it’s not really
necessary to send to Haiti a lot of food from the United States. We received too much
food, when locally it was possible to find food to buy to help the people.”58
The purchase of US agricultural products for foreign food aid began in an attempt to
expand US markets in 1954 with the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act.
The program required the US to spend a certain amount each year regardless of the
humanitarian needs of foreign nations. Haiti Justice League’s Yaffe said he believes this
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shows the U.S. government’s first priority was to recoup costs of the program, not
helping foreigners in need.59
The US Government Global Food Security Strategy of 2017 states that “through
diplomacy and programmatic support, we will continue to work closely with
governments and with national and local stakeholders to advance and help implement an
evidence-based policy agenda consistent with international obligations and U.S. policy
objectives”.60 The problem is that US policy objectives are flawed. USAID admitted that
the program was flawed, and urged the US congress to allow for direct cash assistance to
be provided to Haitians. USAID officials estimated that two to four million more people
every year would benefit if more of the budget could be spent on procuring food aid
locally.61
Haiti would benefit more if the US sent its food security humanitarian payments directly
to the Agriculture Sectors of the Haitian government to support the local resources. The
capacity of the Haitian government could then be supported by the humanitarian actors as
is the UN mandate. According to the GAO, about half of all global food aid is donated by
the US and it is responsible for what is called ‘food dumping’ or sending a surplus of
heavily subsidized food like what happened in Haiti.62 The current model usurps the
power of the Haitian state, hurts the people it is meant to protect, while financially
supporting American grain and shipping industries. USAID, the USDA, and Congress
can play a very important role in alleviating poverty in Haiti if this flawed model is
repaired. Foreign assistance is crucial in an emergency to get food aid to a population if
no food is available locally, but it should be a system that supports the local capacity, not
one that undermines it through a predatory relationship of disaster capitalism.
Having food reserves is important. The influx of food aid after the shock event is
problematic when it is done in excess. The ‘food dumping’ model creates a humanitarian
machine that is reactive instead of preventative63. Fiona Terry, author and relief worker
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who has been based in the thick of Northern Iraq, Somalia, Africa's Great Lakes region
and the Sino-Korean border, suggests, “the duty to provide humanitarian assistance
occurs only once the duty to avoid depriving and to protect from deprivation have failed
to be performed”64. Terry continues, “Humanitarian assistance is necessary only once
governments have been unwilling or unable to shoulder their respective
responsibilities”65. “It is as if to say, we will tolerate brutal regimes and human
deprivation unless and until conditions are so severe that only the military can rescue the
victims.”66 The funding for relief is much greater than that for prevention, and the UN
has traditionally intervened when things have already fallen apart. This framework of
emergency relief rather than prevention is important for this system of disaster capitalism
to flourish. When the global community wants to help the people suffering from disaster,
it is easy to only see the surface level of aid, like flooding a market with cheap food. We
have to look beyond the initial need. Fulfilling the needs of people suffering form disaster
is one thing but filling the needs to the point that the aid completely undermines the local
capacity is another. There is a lot of money being made as these points of chaos. With the
bolstering of local capacity before a natural hazards strikes, there will be less of a need
for the involvement of the international resources like subsidized US rice. Decreasing
dependence on foreign humanitarian resources means increased funding for disaster
prevention measures.
Disaster prevention measures have been underfunded in comparison to emergency relief.
Disaster Risk Reduction is currently guided by the Sendai Framework for Action.
Previously it was the Hyogo Framework for Action which succeeded the 1990‘s that were
deemed the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction by the UN General
Assembly. It has been reported by UNDP that “disaster relief will have a propensity to be
overzealously funded while disaster risk reduction will remain the poor cousin in
development cooperation”.67 Papa Seck of the United Nation Development Programme
(UNDP) describes the arena of disaster relief as being rife with “perverse incentives” and
“opportunistic behavior”.68 Policy changes that focus more funding on disaster
prevention, and the support of local capacity to decrease disaster risks can mitigate future
emergency situations. In the final section of this paper I will discuss the ways in which
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mandated community engagement and participation might push back against the
corruption of disaster capitalism and help to support local capacity building.
Haiti: Shelter Cluster
The earthquake revealed the weakness of physical structures. Many of the buildings that
existed before the earthquake were not earthquake safe and many being rebuilt are not
earthquake safe increasing the risk and vulnerability of the population. The infrastructure
in the city was significantly damaged. The Presidential Palace, the Parliament, the
national assembly building, Law Courts and many other key ministries as well as
subsidiary buildings. 30 of 49 hospitals in the capital region as well as 80% of schools
were destroyed.69 Thousands of people were killed by falling cement blocks. Building
with cement cinderblocks and rebar is relatively cheap and is a well-known building
practice in the country.
UN OCHA Cluster Approach and disaster capitalism: Caracol EKAM
The IFRC was the Cluster Lead Agency of the UN Shelter Cluster from February, 2010 November, 2010 when the position was handed over to UN Habitat. Top government
donors to UN Habitat from 2010 to 2016 were Japan (249.4 million), EU (146.8 million),
and the US (132.2 million). “Housing has been the most urgent priority, yet the one most
ignored or mismanaged by foreign donors,” said Odnell David, a housing division chief
with the Haitian government’s Unit for Housing Construction and Public Buildings.70
The safe construction and retrofitting of residential homes, schools and government
buildings should be the priority in building back better. There are examples of
construction projects in post-earthquake Haiti that have gone against what the population
want and are pushed through by powerful NGOs and banks regardless of the local
desires. An example of this is the Caracol Industrial Park (CIP) project. The project was
planned by the US and Haitian governments with IDB and the Clinton Foundation. The
project is in Caracol, Haiti and involves an industrial park with an adjacent housing
project to house the people displaced by the earthquake. The park was constructed as part
of the 2010 National Action Plan to spur economic development outside of Port-auPrince. The CIP is owned by the Government of Haiti and is managed by the National
Society of Industrial Parks (SONAPI) under Haiti’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
The public-private partnership includes the Government of Haiti, the IDB, The US
Government, and Sae-A Trading Co. Ltd. (Korea’s leading garment manufacturer who
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supplies US companies like Walmart, the Gap and Old Navy).71 The mixed-use light
manufacturing facility was touted as a major site for job creation, claiming it would
create 60,000 jobs. It only filled 5,300 because Haitians do not want to work there and
were not considered in the design and implementation of the project. There were also a
lot of questions about the 1,500 farmers who were displaced by the project and whether
they received adequate compensation for being displaced. 72 They had been promised
land but then were delayed in receiving it because the land promised was, actually, not
available.
USAID views garment factory jobs as beneficial employment for the Haitian people yet
there were no local studies done to determine the type of work that the local population
desires. The goal is to increase domestic and foreign investment, and the model is to
create incentives for the international apparel industry. The garment sector is re-emerging
as a source of employment for Haitians whether it is what the local population wants or
not. This emergence of new job opportunities is related to the US trade preferences
enacted through the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership
Encouragement Act (HOPE) and Haiti Economic Lift Program Act of 2010 (HELP). The
US Government is funding the construction of a 10-megawatt power plant adjacent to the
park through the USAID in the name of strengthening the economic development of
Haiti. The project is sold on the justification that CIP, according to Sae-A, will serve
thousands of Haitians who have never been employed. The reality is that the Haitians
who are employed by CIP will continue to make minimum wages that just barely allows
them to eek out an existence while foreign companies extract major profits from their
labor.73
The Caracol EKAM project is the housing development adjacent to the CIP and power
plant. The budget for design and construction was $31.5 million and the community
development budget was $1.5 million. The life of the project was design and construction
first (2011-2013) with the two years following the project implementation as the
community development phase (2013-2015). The implementing Partners were the US
contractors, CEEPCO Contracting, THOR Construction, and Global Communities.
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“Haitian contractors should be used to design houses according to local taste, using local
materials and labor”, said Let Haiti Live Founder Melinda Miles, who called the IDB and
USAID’s housing projects “a total mess, a total failure with very poor planning.” 74
The guidelines of the UN and the Business Sector specify that there should be no unfair
advantage for any particular business sector entity. A priority on local capacity in relief
efforts will be more in line with longterm development goals.
The USAID-built homes in the Caracol project have been called ‘culturally
inappropriate’ and have resulted in plenty that remain either empty or subletted by the
original beneficiaries. “Donors are not doing their homework to understand preferences
and lifestyle of Haiti’s population,” said Gesly Leveque, director general of Banque
Populaire Haitienne. “The houses being built look nice but are not adaptive.”75
The examples of corporate influence shown here in the Agriculture Cluster and the
Shelter Cluster are rife with corruption and unfair business advantages. The proposed
mandates of supporting local capacity are not being determined by the beneficiaries of
aid but rather imposed by the powerful in the name of the poor. The mandate to eradicate
poverty is not being upheld and the actions taken on behalf of the mandates are, in fact,
actively undermining the agency and livelihoods of local stakeholders. If the future of
humanitarianism is to meet its proposed goals of eradicating poverty and bolstering local
capacity, alternative methods to these corrupt, traditional, humanitarian partnerships must
be considered.
Alternatives that help build resilient communities
Elizabeth Hausler, CEO of Build Change, has laid out a model that is participatory and
focused on local capacity building. She suggests a homeowner-driven model of
rebuilding as opposed to a donor-driven development model. A study done by Elizabeth
Hausler, CEO of Build Change, on geodesic domes in India supports the importance of
culturally appropriate solutions which empower homeowners.76 Hausler takes rebuilding
after the earthquake to address not only the structure, but the cultural elements of shelter.
The benefits are that the people are more satisfied with the end results and are more likely
to have a house that fits their individual or family needs.
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Training for building should be done through a process of homeowner-driven
development in the same model as Build Change. The Haitian construction firms can be
supported with technical support and training instead of sidestepped by international
contractors. Once the local market is utilized to capacity then funding can be used for
international support but not until all local capacity is utilized.
Donor-driven projects have the potential of being carried out without the context
specificities necessary for culturally appropriate development. The donors role is to
provide the funding and it is the role of the local government and policy in collaboration
with civil-society organizations and local NGOs to guide the design and actions of the
development process. The UN cluster approach is designed specifically to prevent
situations like the Caracol fiasco from ever getting permission to implement the poor
designs in the first place. How is it that this project was approved? Donors need to be
directed by strict guidelines enforced by strong local government that protect the interests
of the people. More power and resources in the hands of local government with no donor
strings attached will help to tailor the donors ‘good intentions’ and funding to project
designs that bolster local capacity and support the needs of the Haitian people. This will
not happen until the international aid machine prioritizes the support of local capacity and
stops prioritizing the interests of foreign private business and sidestepping and excluding
the local stakeholders. More international aid money and training funneled to the local
municipal governments of Haiti is one step in empowering the self-determined
livelihoods of the local. Efficient and thorough surveying of the beneficiaries of aid will
ensure the relief and development actions are serving sustainable livelihoods of Haitians.
Stricter government oversight of international business involvement and policy designed
with the interests of the Haitian people at the center will decrease vulnerability to disaster
and create a productive functioning society that can participate in and contribute to the
global community. Enforced UN policy such as the 10 Principles of the UN Global
Compact are what will restrict actions of corruption and ensure that donor interests do not
undercut local interests.
The UN Cluster Approach can be an entry point for these measures to be carried out but
the unhealthy relationships to business interests need to be changed. The UN already has
the relationship with the local elite and the international community. It is time for the
people to have a place at the table, be respected as citizens of a sovereign nation and be
the center of the design and implementation of projects that will shape the future of Haiti.
With a country prone to earthquakes and hazards, a preventative measure that the UN can
take for the future is to ensure that the government of Haiti has the adequate resources
and technical support for the ministry of public works to assist the country in setting up
building practices in line with the National Construction Code of Haiti (CNBH) and the
International Building Codes (IBC).
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The earthquake broke the struggling nation made weak by the meddling of the
international community through actions of structural violence carried out by powerful
international states and companies. Disaster capitalism is present in post-earthquake Haiti
in the form of free market competition capitalized on by international actors such as the
companies contracted by USAID and allowed by the UN through their neoliberal UN and
Business Sector Guidelines that state that no company will be given unfair advantage.
When there is local capacity that can be supported and utilized in the relief efforts, it
should be given priority, ‘fair advantage’, over international companies. The UN could
prevent the excess spending and undermined local capacity by ensuring that local
businesses are given contracts first and if they do not meet operational standards, then
training and support should be funded. The model that already exists for humanitarian
relief coordination could be modified to more adequately fit the sustainable development
agenda of the UN.
Resilience and participation
NGOs, often frustrated with the Cluster Approach, voice their concern that the approach
is too centralized, with the power dynamic heavily weighted on the side of UN agencies,
and increasingly securitized relief, rather than prevention, are the focus. The UN 2010
Executive Summary identified gaps and shortcomings in the Cluster Approach. They
include exclusion of national and local actors, failure to support existing coordination and
response mechanisms, lack of sufficient analysis of local structures and capacities prior to
cluster implementation, and the weakening of national and local ownership. These
failures are linked to the framework of action on which the Cluster Approach is based.
One crucial limitation is the inattention to social capital as a critical component of
successful participatory humanitarian response.77
Social capital improves the resilience and capability of a population and mitigates risk
and vulnerability to disaster. Social capital is characterized as: bonding social capital
(connections to kinship groups); bridging social capital (connections beyond kinship
groups); or linking social capital (connections to people in power). It is theorized as a set
of norms and networks utilizing relationships of trust to access and mobilize resources
which enable the community or individual to recover more quickly from a disaster and to
design a more secure future. Social capital that functions both vertically and horizontally
throughout community on the local to the global scale is necessary for sustainable
disaster prevention, relief, and recovery. When international involvement damages the
connections of social capital such as undermining local markets, it works against
resiliency.
A national pre-disaster asset, capacity, vulnerability, and needs assessment can determine
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the risk factors present in a population that can cause disaster when compounded by a
shock event. One of OCHA’s main themes is ‘needs assessment’ that claims to provide a
holistic view of the local situation. The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) is created
to inform the Programme Cycle and Strategic Planning. Humanitarian response is largely
designed around these incomplete initial assessments. The actions that follow, because
they are based on insufficient information, are not fully or holistically meeting the needs
of the population encouraging a victim-provider relationship in which handouts are the
norm.
Due to a lack of initial analysis of local capacity and assets, the Humanitarian Needs
Overview( HNO) gives the perception that the local population is helpless and resource
poor and drives the clusters to fill the needs through international resources. When free
resources are dumped on a struggling nation it ruins local markets and creates negative
externalities by putting local businesses under. Rather than strengthening local capacity, it
is undermined and weakened by the international actions taken to fill the need. The local
government and organizations embedded in the machine should be granted the positions
of decision-making power and adequately funded and trained within the humanitarian
arena as the UN mandate designates. This will guide the relief in a direction that is
focused on meeting the needs of the local beneficiaries.
An emphasis on capacity and assets, in addition to vulnerability and needs, can best
inform people-centered humanitarian assistance. The contemporary humanitarian analysis
is excessively focused on needs assessments. How can the humanitarian approach
“register the other side of the coin”78? A needs based framework creates a narrative
where the beneficiaries of aid are often viewed and treated as passive victims. When the
people affected by the disaster are rendered powerless through this model, the
humanitarian actors assume the powerful role of provider and have the power and the
responsibility to protect and fulfill these needs. This is not to say that the local
population in a disaster setting has all the resources to recover from a hazard event. The
international community is exceedingly important in the relief. The balance between
providing international assistance and bolstering local capacity could be better informed
by a more thorough initial analysis of the local capacity. A population has local
knowledge of resources that would benefit them if access to those resources is supported.
Power is concentrated in the hands of the provider as resources flow in from the
international community. A local capacity and asset assessment can determine how local
resources can also help to fulfill local needs.
International resources, in the form of aid money, funneled through the Central
Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and the Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBFP) can
better serve the population by first and foremost addressing the immediate needs of the
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affected population with the knowledge that over-flooding a market with aid can have
negative externalities for the local markets and addressing and supporting local capacity
is imperative for the transition to long term sustainable development.
The work of Michele Montas in post-disaster relief analysis is an example for a model
that can be operationalized and used to better inform the aid process. Previously a radio
journalist for Radio Haiti and then Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, Montas was asked to join the UN team after the earthquake as Special Advisor to
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative.79 Montas spent the first few months
after the earthquake holding focus groups and recording the opinions and aspirations of
the ordinary people of Haiti; the market women, the farmers, the tradespeople. In March
2010, she presented her national survey report at the UN-sponsored post-earthquake
Donors’ Conference.80 Her work summarized “clear messages for more participation and
an end to exclusion; decentralization and deconcentration of public services; greater
investment in ordinary people; aid that respects Haiti’s sovereignty; equal treatment, with
dignity, for all Haitians.” 81 Qualitative reporting such as the information gathered
through Montas’ study, can best inform the response. The intended result is that the
coordination after an emergency will be directed by a thorough knowledge of the local
context.
In agriculture, some local needs include training, equipment, seeds, easier access to
credit, and the introduction of modern agriculture techniques. Agriculture is viewed as a
legitimate source of employment in Haiti and can be supported by the international
community if the jobs are not outsourced to the foreign private sector. The international
food suppliers undercut these local efforts, capacity, and aspirations when they fill this
gap themselves instead of taking their place in a supporting role for the local farmers. Aid
money provided to subsidize local produce and implement a modern system of
agricultural production using appropriate technology has the potential of increasing
sustainable accessibility. By shifting the humanitarian aid towards the local, for-profit,
private agricultural sector, local resource capacity can be fully engaged. Social capital of
the population will increase around local market hubs, reducing the risk of future
disasters, and the negative externalities of neglecting the local agricultural market
economy can be avoided. The research done by Michele Montas resembles the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, a model that if it is more integrated into the UN
OCHA Cluster System, has the potential of decreasing the division between good
intentioned private businesses and the aspirations of the local people.
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Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SLA is a people-centered framework for humanitarian and development efforts at poverty
reduction by addressing vulnerability. The approach focuses on the different types of
capital that people in vulnerable situations have and how these case specific assets can be
used to identify aspirations and opportunities from the perspective of the vulnerable
population themselves. Everything revolves around these aspirations and opportunities to
cater to the specific needs of the population involved. The framework emphasizes the
importance of looking at the vulnerable populations relationship with the different
processes that govern their lives and how specific characteristics of the population such
as age, gender, class, and ethnicity can have a large impact on how these processes affect
livelihoods. This approach to working with vulnerable populations asks the important
question of how vulnerable populations can access their self-defined livelihood assets
with the support of enabling agencies and service providers.
The idea of the sustainable livelihoods framework was first introduced by the Brundtland
Commission on Environment and Development and it was expanded upon by the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 199282. The definition used
here is taken from Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway’s original definition that has
been reworked by the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) and the British
Department for International Development (DFID).
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social
resources), and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when
it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its
capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural
resource base. According to Chambers and Conway, there are three main elements of
livelihoods. The first is human capabilities (education, skills, health, psychological
orientation), the second is access to tangible and intangible assets; the third is access to
economic activities. With these three fundamental elements of livelihood in mind, placing
emphasis on empowerment of the poor to take initiative and secure their own livelihood
is the ultimate objective. Strengthening the agency or the capabilities of the poor to
improve their own livelihoods is sustainable in the long term as opposed to the model of
hand outs that can create dependency.83 DFID talks about poverty reduction in a peoplecentered approach that is responsive, participatory, multi-level, conducted in partnership,
sustainable and dynamic.
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This framework for poverty reduction is an approach that attempts to go further than the
conventional approaches to poverty reduction. The sector-based approach, of which the
Cluster Approach is an example is focused too narrowly on providing resources at one
point of access to the vulnerable population. Although there are cross-cutting issues that
are addressed, on a system wide scale, it is not succeeding in the empowerment of the
vulnerable population which is necessary for resiliency. The beneficiaries of the aid
become passive in receiving assistance. The integration of partnerships at the home
country level is crucial for aid to be distributed in an equitable and sustainable way.
In the OCHA strategic framework overview for 2010-2013 a key point was made that
“there will increasingly be a need to transcend traditional definitions of what is
‘humanitarian’ and ‘developmental,’ to create what scholars and aid professionals refer to
as the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. This will assist in moving toward more
integrated country plans and partnerships that may simultaneously promote actions that
increase resilience in the short-term and reduce overall vulnerability in the long-term”. 84
Getting at the root of the problem and doing Disaster Risk Reduction measures through
the SLA can help prevent the trigger event from causing a disaster in the first place. If
livelihoods are improved prior to the shock event, they will be better equipped to cope
with the stress of the shock. It is necessary to look at poverty from a people-centered
approach which analyzes different types of capital the population can access. This can
unveil structural limitations in the society at the root of poverty, preventing people from
achieving sustainable livelihoods.
The UN is beginning to incorporate sustainable livelihood rhetoric into the framework of
disaster relief. Recently, the term Community Engagement, has entered the UN literature
and is used to encourage the system to communicate with communities and set up
processes that further participatory measures in the planning of humanitarian action.
“Community Engagement should be a part of all humanitarian programming; it is the
means by which aid organizations attain accountability as an end.” 85 The three pillars of
Community Engagement according to the UN are participation, feedback and complaints,
and providing information. To ensure that humanitarian needs are addressed effectively,
Community Engagement should be continuous and happen at every stage of the
Humanitarian Programme Cycle.86 The reductions in risk and vulnerability will improve
the lives of the most vulnerable people, and they are essential to ensuring that

84

OCHA, Strategic Framework 2014-2017, https://www.unocha.org/publication/strategic-framework/
strategic-framework-2014-2017 (accessed 2017)
85

OCHA, Community Engagement, https://www.unocha.org/themes/community-engagement (accessed
2017)
86

OCHA, Community Engagement, https://www.unocha.org/themes/community-engagement (accessed
2017)
37

development progress is accessible to all communities, including those affected by
crises.87
The one component that is missing from the UN framework is strict policy that limits the
engagement of the international private sector by ensuring that the local capacity is
utilized first. “Community Engagement” is critically needed but if contracts are still
signed between the UN and international businesses before the local businesses are
contracted or supported, community engagement means little. The system has not
achieved true participatory decision making and the beneficiaries of aid do not have an
equal voice in the process. The UN OCHA themes of ‘Community Engagement’ and
‘Needs Assessment’ can still benefit from the introduction of the Sustainable Livelihood
Approach (SLA) which emphasizes the need for capacity and asset analysis in the
beginning phases of a disaster to inform sustainable strategic planning from the outset.
Policy considerations for the UN
In Haiti, there were warning signs that were not heeded. Eric Calais, a geophysicist at
Purdue University in West Lafayette who took a leave from his work at the university to
lead the UN disaster risk reduction programme in Haiti, comments on the lack of
prevention measures taken before the earthquake saying, "Aid agencies usually focus on
response. It's a new thing to spend money on prevention and mitigation . . . It's sad it
takes 250,000 people dead to get to that point, but we're there now."88 Lessons learned in
this context have indeed spurred actions by the UN in collaboration with the national
government of Haiti and the DPC Direction de la Protection Civile to prevent a future
disaster of this magnitude, only it comes a few years too late for those who perished in
the earthquake.
One key issue is that prior to the 2010 earthquake, there existed no National Disaster Risk
Reduction Platform in a country widely recognized as extremely susceptible to natural
hazards. By unpacking the vulnerability and risk factors for disaster and defining assets
and stakeholders involved prior to a hazardous event, a more streamlined and integrated
support framework from the international community can better mitigate disaster like the
horrendous suffering that occurred in Haiti. With the severe impacts of climate change
that we are seeing, emergency relief is crucial but to create long-term stability,
sustainability and resilience, the New Humanitarian school must analyze and act with
strong people-centered policies focused on prevention and livelihood assessment to
prevent future disasters.
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What we have seen in the case of Haiti is little preventative measures to reduce risk and
vulnerability from massive disaster. When an emergency situation happens, the
humanitarian response should be connected to the long-term development goals of the
country. One change that could help this process become more streamlined is an
adjustment to the Humanitarian Needs Overview. Currently, it does not include an
analysis of the local capacity, but rather gives an overview of the population needs. The
UN and allied business sector fill the needs through contracted business deals that are
often not aligned with the priorities of the local population. The Least Developed
Countries( LDCs) cannot compete on the global market with large companies that are
supported by wealthy developed nations. Therefore, in humanitarian emergencies, an
analysis of local resources and business protection for the local capacity are in order.
A proposed amendment to the Humanitarian Needs Overview
Humanitarian Needs and Capacity Overview: It is suggested that The Humanitarian
Needs Overview HNO be renamed as the Humanitarian Needs and Capacity Overview
HNCO to be carried out immediately following an emergency event. It is recommended
that OCHA fill the needs primarily with the local capacity that exists, work to bolster
local capacity with funding and technical support, and supplement local capacity with the
international community resources.
The UN and Business Sector Guidelines currently state: “Partner selection will be subject
to due diligence processes established by the UN entity considering the partnership. UN
entities are encouraged to consult with each other as part of the due diligence process.
UN entities reserve the right to choose their partners on a case by case basis and to
undertake research in support of such decisions.”89 The UN and Business Sector
guidelines further support the “No unfair advantage principal” which refers to the right of
every member of the Business Sector community to have the opportunity to propose
cooperative arrangements, within the parameters of these Guidelines. The UN can
collaborate with the Business Sector for the purposes of development and provision of
goods and services that explicitly support and accelerate achievement of UN goals.
However, cooperation should not provide exclusivity in its collaboration or imply
endorsement or preference of a particular Business Sector entity or its products or
services.90 It seems that the UN has not upheld these principals in the case of Haiti in
regards to the USAID projects that were approved.
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As previously shown, the UN partnerships were insufficient to serving the UN mandate.
In Haiti, the Caracol project and the FAO contracts with US businesses exemplify this
point. In an attempt to prevent a more powerful business entity from undermining local
capacity, it is recommended that a balancing of power through fair advantage be given to
the local business sector entities in order to foster local resilience in humanitarian
settings.
A Proposed amendment to the US and Business Sector Guidelines
Local Business Sector Engagement Policy: It is recommended that local business
capacity be analyzed and given priority and resources in training before the international
business sector is engaged by the UN for humanitarian and development projects. The
international business sector has beneficial resources that ought to be engaged as an
“implementing partner” only in emergency situations when the local capacity is
unavailable as determined by the HNCO. If an international business is contracted as an
“implementing partner”, part of the mandate is that ownership is transitioned to the local
stakeholders once capacity is attained. The international business sector can be hired by
the UN as consultants to train local businesses so long as the international business
ideology is aligned with the local culture and is approved by the local community. The
HNCO will inform the actions of the local and international businesses engaging in each
cluster.
Conclusion
The earthquake triggered the collapse of an already struggling society and the prevailing
vulnerabilities in the country became even more obvious after the earthquake. The effects
of the natural event are directly linked to the preexisting vulnerability of the population
resulting form decades of underdevelopment. The earthquake or ‘trigger event’ which
shook the foundation of Haiti revealed to the world the weakness of the government as
well as the severely compromised livelihoods of the population. The harmful effects of
the free market economy on the local communities of Haiti are entrenched in the history
of the country and the damaging relationships of the United Nations. To unveil the deeply
rooted vulnerability in Haiti and look at the core causes of the disaster, rather than
focusing on the natural hazard itself, will contribute to the plans for mitigation and
preparedness measures for the future. The United Nations OCHA Cluster Approach and
the prioritization of private business interests have contributed to unsatisfactory results in
the attempts to operationalize the mandates regarding local participation, community
engagement and capacity building.
The depraved and ruthless capitalist model that justifies profits in the name of helping the
poor by enslaving the people is becoming increasingly defunct. Private businesses and
private investment have a very important role to play in the development of nations but
these entities must be more strictly regulated. The ultimate hope is that the international
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business community will be humbled by regulatory measures enacted by the United
Nations that strive for a balance of power. With UN policy shifts towards utilizing local
capacity and bolstering local businesses in disaster settings, the short-term, UN
humanitarian agenda can be more aligned with the long-term, development agenda.
The UN structure of the Cluster Approach could be positively informed by the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach. The solution lies in these efforts to balance global
power dynamics and foster communities where people have access to necessary
resources, agency and self-determination. The goal is for the root causes of vulnerability
to be determined before disaster strikes and addressed with a people-centered approach
that builds communities of resilience therefore preventing future disasters. By working
with the vulnerable population and recognizing self-defined livelihood assets, enabling
agencies and service providers can model their assistance from this foundation of local
knowledge and capacity.
In these challenging times, the narrative of profiting from disaster and the desperation of
impoverished laborers is brutal, outdated, and of an old world order. To render this old
structure obsolete, recognition of its violent nature is necessary along with a shift in
power through the implementation of enforced and appropriate policy adjustments. This
means the UN must stop prioritizing big corporations who have no loyalties to the local
people. Markets alone are unable to solve social problems and above all are unable to
mediate and regulate the influences of private corporations. We have to look behind all of
the perceived benefits of these global economic trends and support communities in
strengthening their own economies. The challenge is that equality to the privileged feels
like oppression and the privileged hold the cards. It is about bringing more of the power
back to the local, profits for the most wealthy will decrease and the lifestyles of the rich
and powerful will have to determine what it means to have humility as a member of this
global community.

41

Appendix

Building homes in a homeowner-driven model with design criteria for reconstruction
efforts. Example from research done by Elizabeth Hausler and Build Change in Gujerat,
India.
In Gujerat, India, “most homeowners didn’t actually build a house themselves; instead,
they hired local masons or teams of builders and took advantage of technical assistance
provided by government-trained engineers.”91 There is room in the homeowner-driven
model for people to determine what works best for them which aside from ensuring that
the building meets the anti-seismic and hazard resistance building codes is ultimately the
main goal. Hausler argues that the donor-driven models are often seismically stable but
because the homeowner was not empowered to make construction and design decisions
and work directly with the builders, there was an issue of trust and perception that the
house might not actually be safe. In Gujerat, some homes were abandoned soon after the
construction was completed because the elements of the house were not functional for the
lifestyles of the people occupying them (the toilet was inside the house instead of outside
so it was not used) or the houses were modified by the homeowner to fit certain cultural
specificities which then made them seismically unsafe undoing the initial efforts.
Hausler proposed a set of criteria for the reconstruction efforts in Haiti based on work
done in Gujerat, India. The mission is based on the idea that “empowering homeowners,
builders, construction professionals, and local governments to drive change is a more
cost-effective and lasting solution than building houses for people.”92
Design Criteria for Permanent Housing Reconstruction
Technology
• Disaster resistant design—compliant with standards and guidelines
• Disaster resistant construction—built with quality workmanship
• Durable and permanent
• Built with locally available materials and skills
• Easily expanded and maintained using locally available materials and skills
Money
• Competitive in cost with common local (but vulnerable) building methods
People
• Environmentally neutral, using no illegal materials

91

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00047

92

Elizabeth Hausler, Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti: The Homeowner-Driven Model,
2010, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00047 (accessed 2017)
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• Suitable to the climate
• Culturally appropriate in architecture, space, and features
• Secure from break-ins and pests
• Designed and built with the participation of the people
• Trusted by inhabitants, who must believe their house will survive a disaster93

93

Elizabeth Hausler, Building Earthquake-Resistant Houses in Haiti: The Homeowner-Driven Model,
2010, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00047 (accessed 2017)
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